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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
 This petition to review a motion to reopen decade-old 
immigration proceedings turns on a single legal issue: whether 
a conviction from 2000 for second-degree New Jersey robbery, 
see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1, constitutes an aggravated felony 
“theft offense” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as 
amended, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  It does.  From that 
conclusion, everything else falls into place.  An aggravated 
felony theft offense constitutes a “particularly serious crime.”  
3 
Id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B).  And commission of 
such a crime disqualifies an alien from seeking asylum.  See id. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Similarly, a conviction for a particularly 
serious crime coupled with a prison sentence of at least five 
years, which petitioner received, bars withholding of removal.  
See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  Because asylum and withholding 
are the only forms of relief sought in this case, we will deny 
the petition.   
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 In 1994, K.A., a citizen of Nigeria, entered the United 
States without admission or parole.  He settled in New Jersey, 
and in 1997, he married a woman who was a United States 
citizen.  He also began to commit a series of crimes.  Those 
offenses included second-degree robbery under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:15-1 and third-degree possession with intent to distribute 
a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7.  For the robbery, K.A. received a 
sentence of ten years, and for the drug crime, five years.  Those 
sentences ran concurrently, and K.A. was incarcerated from 
2002 until his parole in 2008.  
  
 K.A.’s release from custody would only be temporary, as 
incarceration became the norm for him over the next decade.  
Shortly after his parole, in August 2008, the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained K.A. after it 
commenced removal proceedings against him.  In 2010, 
however, while those proceedings were ongoing, K.A. was 
released on bond and began a relationship with a woman who 
was not his wife.  After they were together for almost a year, 
in April 2011, K.A. was pulled over for driving under the 
influence in a car rented in her name.  A search of that car 
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revealed potential evidence of fraud, and a federal grand jury 
in New Jersey later indicted K.A. on multiple counts of using 
inmates’ personal information to submit fraudulent tax returns 
and receive tax refunds.  As a result, K.A. began criminal 
pretrial detention in April 2011. 
 
 During that time, his immigration proceedings ran their 
course.  K.A. conceded removability, but still sought asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture.  He premised those requests for relief on 
Decree 33, a Nigerian law that authorized prosecutions for 
drug convictions abroad.  The Immigration Judge initially 
found K.A. ineligible for asylum and withholding due to his 
drug conviction but granted him CAT deferral.  After DHS 
administratively appealed that decision (K.A. did not appeal), 
the BIA found error with the CAT deferral analysis and 
remanded that issue.  On remand, the Immigration Judge 
denied CAT deferral.  K.A. administratively appealed that 
decision but to no avail.  The BIA affirmed that ruling and 
issued a final order of removal.  This Court denied K.A.’s 
subsequent petition for review of that final order.   
 
 Although he remained in criminal pretrial custody 
throughout those removal proceedings, several other 
developments occurred.  In 2014, Nigeria enacted the Same 
Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act.  That law criminalized same-
sex marriage, same-sex cohabitation as sexual partners, as well 
as other conduct, such as public displays of same-sex affection.  
Also in 2014, K.A. began a sexual relationship with his male 
cellmate, and the two had over fifteen sexual encounters until 
the cellmate’s release in mid-2015.  More than a year later, in 
December 2016, and after he had been in criminal pretrial 
detention going on six years, K.A. realized that he had “always 
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felt attracted to men” and that his “identity as a bisexual man 
[was] permanent.”  Affidavit of K.A. (AR156).   
 
 Soon after, on January 25, 2017, the federal district court in 
New Jersey dismissed K.A.’s criminal charges for lack of a 
speedy trial.  K.A. was then transferred from criminal custody 
to immigration custody pending his removal, which was 
scheduled for August 2017.  But he never boarded his return 
flight.   
 
 Shortly before his scheduled departure, on July 28, 2017, 
K.A. filed a motion with the BIA to reopen his immigration 
proceedings.  In that motion, K.A. sought asylum and 
withholding of removal.  He premised those requests on 
changed country conditions in Nigeria (the Same Sex Marriage 
(Prohibition) Act) coupled with his changed personal 
circumstances (bisexuality).  Specifically, he asserted that 
under intervening Supreme Court decisions – Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), and Mathis v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) – his prior New Jersey drug conviction 
no longer qualified as an aggravated felony (and thus it was not 
a particularly serious crime).  Without that designation, K.A. 
argued that he was eligible for asylum and withholding.  K.A. 
also presented other arguments, including that his 
circumstances were exceptional enough that the BIA should 
sua sponte reopen his proceedings.  Through a supplemental 
filing, K.A. requested CAT protection due to his expressed fear 
that he “would be subjected to harassment and torture due to 
the unfavorable opinion Nigerians hold toward members of the 
LGBT community.”  Form I-589 at 5 (Aug. 15, 2017) (AR51).  
 
 The pendency of K.A.’s motion to reopen did not 
automatically stay his removal.  He was transported to Arizona 
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for a chartered flight to Nigeria, and while there, shortly before 
his scheduled deportation, he moved to stay his removal for the 
pendency of his motion to reopen.  The BIA denied his request.  
K.A. then petitioned for review in both the Third and Ninth 
Circuits.  Before this Court denied his request, the Ninth 
Circuit issued a temporary stay of removal pending a decision 
on the stay motion.  That court eventually dismissed the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the temporary stay, 
but only after K.A. had returned to immigration custody in 
New Jersey instead of boarding the flight to Nigeria.   
 
 Almost three months later, the BIA denied K.A.’s motion 
to reopen.  In that decision, the BIA first determined that K.A. 
was ineligible for asylum and withholding.  But rather than 
assessing whether K.A.’s drug conviction remained a 
particularly serious crime under intervening Supreme Court 
precedent, the BIA instead examined the significance of K.A.’s 
second-degree robbery conviction.  And relying on a non-
precedential opinion, the BIA determined that second-degree 
robbery in New Jersey ‘“clearly constitutes an aggravated 
felony’ theft offense.”  BIA Decision at 1 (Nov. 22, 2017) 
(AR3) (parenthetically quoting Briolo v. Att’y Gen., 
515 F. App’x 126, 128 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013)).  Because an 
aggravated felony theft offense is a particularly serious crime, 
see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B), the BIA 
concluded that K.A. was ineligible for asylum or withholding.  
As for K.A.’s request for CAT protection, the BIA determined 
that the motion was untimely on the theory that K.A. did not 
demonstrate material changes in country conditions.  (That 
conclusion, if correct, would justify the BIA’s denial of K.A.’s 
entire motion to reopen.)  The BIA closed its decision with two 
summary statements: (i) that K.A. did not make a prima facie 
showing of eligibility for any of the relief he requested, and 
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(ii) that K.A. did not establish an exceptional circumstance 
warranting sua sponte reopening.   
 
 K.A. timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s order while 
in immigration detention, bringing the matter within this 
Court’s jurisdiction.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  K.A. also 
moved for a stay of removal, and this Court granted that 
request.   
 
 In his briefs, K.A. challenges four aspects of the BIA’s 
order denying his motion to reopen.  First, he argues that his 
robbery conviction is not an aggravated felony theft offense – 
a conclusion that would render him eligible for asylum and 
withholding.  Second, he disputes the BIA’s assessment that 
the treatment of LGBT persons in Nigeria had not materially 
changed.  From there, K.A. asserts that he demonstrated a 
prima facie case for asylum and withholding of removal – but 
he does not make such an argument for CAT deferral.  Finally, 
he contends that the BIA erred in declining to sua sponte 
reopen his proceedings.  After he submitted his opening brief, 




 Through his petition, K.A. seeks to vacate the BIA’s denial 
of his motion to reopen so that he can pursue asylum and 
withholding of removal on remand.  But if he is ineligible for 
those forms of relief, then his petition cannot succeed.  He must 
therefore prevail on his first argument – that his second-degree 
robbery conviction does not disqualify him from asylum and 
withholding.  However, on de novo review, see Ng v. Att’y 
Gen., 436 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2006), K.A.’s robbery 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony.  And under the 
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circumstances, that bars him from both asylum and 
withholding of removal.  Because K.A. does not attempt to 
make a prima facie case for any other form of relief, such as 
CAT deferral, his petition therefore fails. 
 
A. The Federal Generic Theft Offense  
 
In removal proceedings, an alien who has committed a 
statutorily identified “aggravated felony,” see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43), is ineligible for certain forms of relief.  See 
Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2016).  Because 
aggravated felonies constitute particularly serious crimes, see 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B), a conviction for 
such an offense disqualifies the alien from asylum.  See id. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Similarly, an aggravated felony that 
results in a sentence of at least five years bars the alien from 
seeking withholding of removal under both the INA and the 
CAT.  See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). 
 
As amended, the INA identifies various offenses as 
aggravated felonies.  One of those is a “theft offense”:  
 
The term “aggravated felony” means . . . a theft 
offense (including receipt of stolen property) or 
burglary offense for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year[.] 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); see also Immigration and 
Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-416, sec. 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4321 (adding “theft 
offense (including receipt of stolen property)” to the list of 
aggravated felonies).  Unlike some other aggravated felonies, 
“theft offense” does not contain language limiting its scope by 
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“refer[ence] to the specific circumstances in which [the] crime 
was committed.”  Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009); 
see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii) (an offense “relating to 
transportation for the purpose of prostitution[] if committed for 
commercial advantage” (emphasis added)).  Instead, due to its 
more abstract formulation, the term “theft offense” refers to a 
generic formulation of a theft offense, and not any specific 
theft crime.  See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190, 198 (considering 
“generic” federal offenses “in the abstract”); Gonzales v. 
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185 (2007) (finding aiding and 
abetting a “theft offense” to fall within the generic definition).  
 
Consistent with that understanding, courts have developed 
a definition for a generic theft offense:  
 
[T]he taking of property or an exercise of control 
over property without consent with the criminal 
intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits 
of ownership, even if such deprivation is less 
than total or permanent.   
 
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 189 (quoting Penuliar v. 
Gonzales, 435 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Lewin 
v. Att’y Gen., 885 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2018) (observing that 
this definition is “an accepted generic definition of a ‘theft 
offense’”).  As formulated, the generic theft offense consists of 
three elements: (i) the taking of property or an exercise of 
control over property; (ii) without consent; and (iii) with the 
criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of 




To date, this Circuit has not considered the precise contours 
of the second element – the without-consent requirement.  And 
in this context, the term ‘consent’ is capable of multiple 
meanings.  It may refer only to assent – the act of agreeing.  
See, e.g., Consent, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1993) (definition 1a: “compliance or approval esp. 
of what is done or proposed by another: acquiescence, 
permission”); Consent, The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language (2d ed. 1987) (“permission, approval, or 
agreement; compliance; acquiescence”).  But ‘consent’ may 
require more than the mere act of agreeing; it may also require 
that the assent be voluntary and intelligent.  See, e.g., Consent, 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) 
(definition 1b: “capable, deliberate, and voluntary agreement 
to or concurrence in some act or purpose implying physical and 
mental power and free action – distinguished from assent”).  In 
articulating the generic theft offense, other circuits have used 
the first definition of ‘consent’ – consent as only assent.  See 
Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282–84 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(originating this theory); see also, e.g., Vassell v. Att’y Gen., 
839 F.3d 1352, 1356–59 (11th Cir. 2016); Carrillo-Jaime v. 
Holder, 572 F.3d 747, 751–54 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Garcia-
Madruga, 24 I. & N. Dec. 436, 439–41 (B.I.A. 2008).  But for 
three reasons, the second definition of ‘consent’ – consent as 
voluntary and intelligent assent – better fits the definition of a 
generic theft offense. 
 
First, statutory text favors the reading of ‘consent’ as 
voluntary and intelligent assent.  By using the term “theft 
offense” – not merely ‘theft’ – in its itemization of aggravated 
felonies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), the INA includes 
conduct beyond ‘theft’; it extends to a family of crimes related 
to theft.  See Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002, 
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1008–09 (7th Cir. 2001) (reading the term “theft offense” as 
“an umbrella label” that “encompasses a myriad of offenses”); 
see also Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162, 174 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Congress used the words ‘theft offense’ rather than just 
‘theft,’ thus indicating that the phrase ought be read to 
incorporate different but closely related constructions in 
modern state statutes.” (parenthetically quoting United States 
v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc))), overruled on other grounds by Al-Sharif v. U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 734 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc).  Similarly, the INA expressly includes “receipt of stolen 
property,” as a theft offense, signaling again that the term “theft 
offense” should not be limited to a narrow conception of theft.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  Also, in terms of impact, a 
construction of the without-consent element to mean ‘without 
assent’ would exclude a multitude of state-law theft crimes 
from the federal generic definition.1  But significantly 
 
1 See, e.g., Lopez-Aguilar v. Barr, 948 F.3d 1143, 1147–49 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (holding that third-degree Oregon robbery is not a 
theft offense because “a defendant could be convicted if she 
threatened force against a third party to compel that third party 
to convince a property owner, by deception, to give the 
property to the defendant consensually” or “if the taking was 
consensual (although deceptive), but force was used against a 
third party to prevent that person from retrieving the property 
right after it was received by the thief”); Vassell, 839 F.3d at 
1359–61 (holding that Georgia theft by taking is not a theft 
offense because it does not “require any lack of consent on the 
part of the victim”); Mena v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 114, 118–20 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (holding that federal receipt of embezzled property 
is not a theft offense because “[b]y definition, 
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diminishing the volume of theft-related crimes included within 
the federal generic definition of “theft offense” is incompatible 
with the INA’s use of the broad term “theft offense.”   
 
Second, the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘theft’ supports 
this construction of the without-consent element.  At the time 
Congress amended the INA to include “theft offenses” as 
 
embezzlement . . . involves property that came into the initial 
wrongdoer’s hands with the owner’s consent”); Lopez-
Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that California theft is not a theft offense because it could be 
committed through theft by false pretenses); Castillo v. Holder, 
776 F.3d 262, 268–70 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that Virginia 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a theft offense 
because a conviction is possible for “a defendant’s use of a 
vehicle in a manner not specifically authorized by its owner, 
even if such use is consistent with the owner’s general policy 
regarding use, occurs during the period the vehicle is entrusted 
to the defendant, and results in no damage to the vehicle”); 
Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 197 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that Virginia grand larceny is not a theft offense 
because “under the generic federal definition of ‘theft,’ 
fraudulent takings do not constitute takings ‘without consent’” 
(citation omitted)); Carrillo-Jaime, 572 F.3d at 750–54 
(holding that, in California, owning or operating a premises 
where any person has engaged in destroying a car or car parts 
“known to be illegally obtained by theft, fraud, or conspiracy 
to defraud” is not a theft offense because the car or car parts 
could be obtained through theft by false pretenses, fraud in the 
inducement, or through similar conspiracies to defraud 
(citation omitted)). 
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aggravated felonies, the prevailing legal understanding of 
‘theft’ described the offense as including the following:   
 
The taking of property without the owner’s 
consent or from the possession of some person 
holding the same for him, with intent to deprive 
the owner of the value of the same, and to 
appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person 
taking.  
 
Theft, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis 
added).  See generally Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2067, 2070 (2018) (observing that a court’s “job is to 
interpret the words consistent with their ‘ordinary meaning . . . 
at the time Congress enacted the statute’” (quoting Perrin v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))).  This definition of 
‘theft’ continued, expressly including within the offense’s 
scope “swindling; embezzlement; theft by deception; theft by 
threat or extortion; theft by false pretext; and theft of services.”  
Theft, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).  But some of 
those crimes could not be considered thefts if the without-
consent element meant only ‘without assent,’ as opposed to 
‘without voluntary and intelligent assent.’  Similarly, the 
Model Penal Code consolidated theft and related offenses into 
a single offense.  See Model Penal Code § 223.1(1) (1962).  In 
grouping together related theft offenses as thefts, the Model 
Penal Code specifically included categories of theft that could 
not be thefts if the without-consent element were read to mean 
only ‘without assent.’  Those include theft by unlawful taking 
or disposition; theft by deception; theft by extortion; theft of 
property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake; receiving stolen 
property; theft of services; theft by failure to make required 
disposition of funds received; and unauthorized use of 
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automobiles and other vehicles.  See id. §§ 223.2–223.9.  Thus, 
when Congress added the term “theft offense” to the INA’s list 
of aggravated felonies, the comparatively narrower term, 
‘theft’ was understood to include crimes that can be committed 
only without ‘voluntary and intelligent assent.’  That is telling, 
as it is implausible that without any indication in the statutory 
text, Congress intended for the comparatively broader term 
“theft offense” to exclude crimes that were generally 
understood to be ‘thefts.’ 
 
Third, the historical evolution of theft crimes indicates that 
the without-consent element now means ‘without voluntary 
and intelligent assent.’  Theft originated from common-law 
larceny, which occurred “when one person misappropriated 
another’s property by means of taking it from his possession 
without his consent.”  Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Substantive 
Criminal Law § 19.1(a) (3d ed. Oct. 2020 update).  But over 
time, larceny by trick emerged as a common-law offense for 
obtaining possession of another’s property through a lie, with 
the intention of, and succeeding in, misappropriating that 
property.  See id.  In the eighteenth century, the English 
Parliament established the related crime of false pretenses (and 
it later recognized embezzlement as well).  See id. § 19.1(b).  
The Model Penal Code remained true to that tradition by 
defining consent to exclude instances in which assent alone 
was given.  Those circumstances include legal incompetency, 
youth, mental disease, intoxication, improvident consent, and 
inducement “by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to 
be prevented by the law defining the offense.”  Model Penal 
Code § 2.11(3).  Deeply engrained in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence is the principle that “an apparent consent is not 
effective unless, as a factual matter, it is voluntary and 
intelligent.”  Charles E. Torcia, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law 
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§ 46 (15th ed. Aug. 2020 update).  It would contravene that 
legal heritage to apply a different understanding of consent to 
the without-consent element of the federal generic theft 
offense.  
 
Nor does anything in the INA’s text or structure undermine 
this conclusion.  The INA does separately identify offenses 
involving “fraud or deceit” as aggravated felonies.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); see also, e.g., Soliman, 419 F.3d 
at 282–84 (relying, in part, on this distinction); Vassell, 839 
F.3d at 1356–59 (same); In re Garcia-Madruga, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. at 439–41 (same).  And it may well be that fraud-or-deceit 
offenses under the INA require proof of a lack of voluntary-
and-intelligent-assent.  But that does not mean that such an 
element applies only to fraud-or-deceit offenses.  Sitting en 
banc, this Court has recognized that the elements of multiple 
aggravated felonies can overlap.  See Al-Sharif, 734 F.3d at 
210 (“Although some of these categories of aggravated 
felonies can overlap, each category is separate from the others, 
and a particular conviction may constitute an aggravated 
felony under multiple sections of [8 U.S.C.] 
§ 1101(a)(43).”).  Specifically, the elements of the “theft 
offense” and the “fraud or deceit” aggravated felonies do 
overlap.  See id. at 210–12.  The same is also true for other 
aggravated-felony pairs.  See, e.g., Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 
458 F.3d 213, 217–19 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that forgery 
can be an aggravated felony as either an “fraud or deceit” 
offense under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) or a “forgery” offense under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(R)).  Thus, even supposing that fraud-or-deceit 
offenses require a lack of voluntary and intelligent assent, that 




For these reasons, the term ‘consent’ as used in the federal 
generic definition of “theft offense” means ‘voluntary and 
intelligent assent,’ not merely ‘assent.’  This understanding 
embraces the full family of theft-related crimes – an outcome 
that is more consistent with the statutory text, the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term ‘theft,’ and the historical legal 
conception of consent. 
 
B. The Categorical Approach 
 
 The federal generic definition of theft offense establishes 
the universe of state-law crimes that qualify as “theft offenses” 
under the INA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  For a state-
law crime to fit within the federal generic definition, the 
minimum conduct criminalized by the state-law offense must 
categorically match the federal generic definition for that 
crime.  See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190; Rosa v. Att’y Gen., 
950 F.3d 67, 73 (3d Cir. 2020).  To satisfy that requirement, 
the minimum proof required for the state offense must satisfy 
each element of the federal generic definition.  See Esquivel-
Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017).  Making 
that determination under the so-called categorical approach 
requires a comparison between the elements of the state-law 
crime and those of the generic federal offense; the individual 
facts associated with the state-law offense committed by the 
defendant are immaterial.  See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.2   
 
2 For certain offenses, specifically those that “list elements in 
the alternative, and thereby define multiple crimes,” Mathis, 
136 S. Ct. at 2249, courts may “consult a limited class of 
documents, such as indictments and jury instructions,” 




 Applied here, if the minimum proof required for any New 
Jersey theft crime does not satisfy each of the elements of the 
federal generic theft offense, then that theft crime is not a 
categorical match.  That is relevant because New Jersey 
second-degree robbery – in any of its alternative variations, see 
United States v. McCants, 952 F.3d 416, 427 (3d Cir. 2020) – 
has commission of a theft crime as a common element.  And 
thus, for robbery to qualify as an aggravated felony theft 
offense under the INA, every New Jersey theft crime must 
categorically match the federal generic definition of theft 
offense.  
  
C. New Jersey Second-Degree Robbery  
 
Applying the categorical approach here, the inquiry is 
whether a conviction for New Jersey second-degree robbery 
necessarily meets each element of the federal generic theft 
offense.  As statutorily defined, second-degree robbery in New 
Jersey is premised on the commission of a theft: 
  
A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 
committing a theft, he: 
(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force 
upon another; or 
(2) Threatens another with or 
purposely puts him in fear of 
immediate bodily injury; or 
 
identify which of those alternatives served as the basis for the 
prior conviction.   
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(3) Commits or threatens immediately 
to commit any crime of the first or 
second degree. 
An act shall be deemed to be included in the 
phrase “in the course of committing a theft” if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in 
immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(a) (emphasis added).3  As the 
statutory text makes clear, although there are three alternative 
formulations of New Jersey robbery, they share a common 
element: each must occur during the commission of a theft.  See 
State v. Whitaker, 983 A.2d 181, 190 (N.J. 2009) 
(“Committing or attempting to commit a theft is a necessary 
element of the crime of robbery.”); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 
308, 318 (N.J. 1995) (explaining that the New Jersey Code of 
Criminal Justice “incorporates theft as an element of robbery”), 
superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds, 
N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12; see also McCants, 952 F.3d at 425–26 
(“[T]he New Jersey robbery statute sets out alternative 
elements for sustaining a conviction rather than the means of 
committing the offense.”).  Thus, it has long been understood 
that in New Jersey, “all robberies are thefts.”  Mejia, 662 A.2d 
at 318; accord State v. Lopez, 900 A.2d 779, 784 (N.J. 2006). 
 
3 In the absence of aggravating circumstances, robbery is 
graded as a crime of the second degree.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:15-1(b) (explaining that robbery becomes “a crime of the 
first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor 
attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to 
inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or 
threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon”).   
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When K.A. was convicted of robbery in 2000, New Jersey 
recognized eight theft offenses – each of which could form a 
basis for robbery.  At that time, the New Jersey Code of 
Criminal Justice expressly provided that a person who 
committed any one of the following offenses was “guilty of 
theft”: 
(1) Theft by unlawful taking or 
disposition, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3; 
(2) Theft by deception, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:20-4; 
(3) Theft by extortion, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:20-5; 
(4) Theft of property lost, mislaid, or 
delivered by mistake, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:20-6; 
(5) Receiving stolen property, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:20-7;  
(6) Theft of services, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:20-8; 
(7) Theft by failure to make required 
disposition of property received, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-9; and 
(8) Computer-related theft, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:20-25.4 
 
4 Since the time of K.A.’s conviction in 2000, New Jersey has 
amended two aspects of its code regarding theft offenses.  
Neither of those alters the analysis here.  First, in 2003, New 
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Because any of these eight theft crimes could form a basis 
for second-degree robbery, they each must satisfy the 
categorical approach for robbery to qualify as a “theft offense” 
under the INA.  They do. 
 
 Each of those New Jersey thefts matches the first element 
of the federal generic definition of theft offense – the taking of 
property or an exercise of control over property.  See State v. 
Talley, 466 A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. 1983) (“The common unifying 
conception in all these [theft offenses] is the ‘involuntary 
transfer of property.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Final Report of 
the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II: 
Commentary (1971), § 2C:20–2, at 216)); accord State v. 
Gorman, 185 A.3d 902, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).  
Most of those offenses satisfy this element by explicitly 
referencing either the taking of property or the exercise of 
control over property.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3(a), (b) 
 
Jersey changed the denomination of the computer-related theft 
crime so that it became a “computer criminal activity” crime, 
and not a theft crime.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-25.  Second, 
in 2008, New Jersey enacted an additional theft crime: removal 
of headstones and other markers from gravesites.  See id. 
§ 2C:20-2.3.  That amendment, however, has no bearing on the 
INA’s treatment of K.A.’s robbery conviction because the 
categorical approach evaluates the range of offenses that could 
have served as a basis for the conviction – not conduct 
subsequently criminalized.  See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190–
91 (instructing courts to “presume that the conviction rested 
upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized” 
because the categorical approach requires the examination of 
“what the state conviction necessarily involved” (internal 
quotation, citation, and alterations omitted)). 
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(requiring the taking or exercise of control over movable 
property, or the transfer of any interest in immovable 
property); id. § 2C:20-4 (requiring the obtaining of property); 
id. § 2C:20-5 (requiring the obtaining of property); id. 
§ 2C:20-6 (requiring the coming into control of property); id. 
§ 2C:20-7 (requiring the receiving or bringing into the state 
movable property of another); id. § 2C:20-9 (requiring the 
obtaining or retention of property); id. § 2C:20-25 (requiring 
the altering, damaging, taking, destroying of, or exercising of 
control over computer-related property).  Theft of services also 
meets this element – not because services are property, but 
because it is through services that property in the form of 
compensation for those services or entitlement to those 
services is unlawfully obtained or diverted.  See id. § 2C:20-
8(a), (b).   
 
The second element of the federal generic offense – the lack 
of consent – is also satisfied.  Several of New Jersey’s theft 
crimes satisfy this element under either meaning of consent (as 
‘assent only’ or as ‘voluntarily and intelligent assent’).  See id. 
§ 2C:20-3(a), (b) (unlawful taking, unlawful control over, or 
unlawful transfer); id. § 2C:20-5 (unlawful taking); id. 
§ 2C:20-7 (knowing that the property of another has been 
stolen or believing that it is probably stolen);5 id. § 2C:20-9 
 
5 At a purely theoretical level, it may be possible for a person 
to commit the crime of receiving stolen property, see N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:20-7, based on a mistaken belief that abandoned 
property was in fact stolen, which could undermine the 
without-consent requirement.  But the Supreme Court has 
admonished courts not to overindulge in “legal imagination” 
and instead to focus on whether there is “a realistic probability, 
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(breach of agreement as evidence of lack of consent); id. 
§ 2C:20-25 (without or exceeding authorization).  Other thefts 
may involve the assent of the victim, but not the victim’s 
voluntary and intelligent assent.  See id. § 2C:20-4 (theft by 
deception); id. § 2C:20-6 (lost, mislaid, or delivered under a 
mistake is not voluntary and intelligent assent); id. § 2C:20-
8(a), (b) (obtaining services available for compensation using 
deception, threat, or fraud to avoid payment; or diverting 
services to the benefit of someone not entitled to them).  Those 
offenses predicate theft on deception or coercion.  But, as 
explained above, the better understanding of the without-
consent element of the federal generic definition is ‘without 
voluntary and intelligent assent.’  And under that construction, 
theft crimes predicated on deception or coercion would be 
committed without voluntary and intelligent assent – in 
satisfaction of this element.  See Talley, 466 A.2d at 81 
(identifying another “common unifying conception” in theft 
offenses as the appropriation of “property of the victim without 
 
not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its 
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a 
crime.”  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 
549 U.S. at 193).  Such an imagined conflict is particularly 
inappropriate for the New Jersey offense of receiving stolen 
property because the INA specifically references one offense 
of the entire extended family of theft offenses: receipt of stolen 
property.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  This reference to a 
specific circumstance may render the categorical approach 
unnecessary for this state offense.  See, e.g., Nijhawan, 
557 U.S. at 32–40 (declining to apply the categorical approach 
to a monetary threshold in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).  
Regardless, the abandoned-property hypothetical is too remote 
a possibility to prevent an otherwise categorical match. 
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his consent or with consent obtained by fraud or coercion” 
(quoting Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law 
Revision Commission, Vol. II: Commentary (1971), § 2C:20–
2, at 216)); accord Gorman, 185 A.3d at 907.   
 
All eight New Jersey theft crimes similarly satisfy the third 
element of the federal generic theft offense – the criminal intent 
to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership (even 
if such deprivation is less than total or permanent).  For 
purposes of the federal generic theft offense, criminal intent 
encompasses any “blameworthy” mental state.  See Elonis v. 
United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (quoting Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)).  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has generally recognized that theft is a specific 
intent crime.  See Lopez, 900 A.2d at 784 (“Theft is a specific 
intent crime.  It follows that robbery, as an aggravated form of 
theft, is a specific intent crime as well.” (citations omitted)); 
see also Mejia, 662 A.2d at 316 (“Robbery, like larceny and 
the equivalent statutory offense of theft, requires proof of the 
defendant’s larcenous intent.”).  Consistent with that 
assessment, each theft crime requires a criminal mental state 
among its elements.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3(a) 
(exercises unlawful control over movable property of another 
with purpose to deprive him thereof); id. § 2C:20-3(b) 
(transfers any interest in immovable property of another with 
purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto); id. 
§ 2C:20-4 (purposely obtains property of another); id. § 2C:20-
5 (purposely obtains property of another); id. § 2C:20-6 
(knowing the identity of the owner and with purpose to deprive 
that owner); id. § 2C:20-8(a) (purposely obtains services which 
he knows are available only for compensation); id. § 2C:20-
8(b) (knowingly diverts services of another to which he is not 
entitled); id. § 2C:20-7 (knowingly receives or brings into the 
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state movable property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen or believing that it is probably stolen); id. § 2C:20-9 
(purposely obtains or retains property upon agreement or 
known legal obligation and fails to make the required payment 
or disposition); id. § 2C:20-25 (purposely or knowingly alters, 
damages, takes, or destroys computer-related property). 
 
For these reasons, each of the theft crimes that could have 
formed a basis for robbery in New Jersey at the time of K.A.’s 
offense requires all of the elements of the federal generic theft 
offense.  As a result, each of those crimes constitutes a “theft 
offense” under the INA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).6  
With that conclusion, it follows that K.A.’s conviction for 
second-degree robbery necessarily required satisfaction of 
every element of the federal generic theft offense.  Thus, under 
the categorical approach, at the time of K.A.’s conviction in 
2000, second-degree robbery in New Jersey qualified as a theft 
offense under the INA.   
 
K.A. opposes this conclusion for two reasons, neither of 
which prevails.  First, he contends that New Jersey robbery is 
not a categorical match with the federal generic theft offense 
because robbery can be predicated on theft by deception – 
which, he submits, can be committed with the victim’s consent.  
But that argument rests on the above-rejected premise that, for 
purposes of the second element of the federal generic theft 
 
6 This does not mean that these are the only New Jersey crimes 
that can satisfy each of the elements of the federal generic theft 
offense.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-10 (unlawful taking 
of means of conveyance).  It means only that each of these 
predicate thefts for New Jersey robbery is necessarily a theft 
offense under the INA. 
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offense, ‘consent’ means only ‘assent.’  Under the correct 
understanding – that consent means ‘voluntary and intelligent 
assent’ – K.A.’s argument fails because assent gained through 
deception is not voluntary and intelligent.   
 
Second, K.A. relies on the unavailability of the claim-of-
right affirmative defense to robbery in New Jersey.  Under that 
defense, proof that the defendant “[a]cted under an honest 
claim of right to the property or service involved or that he had 
a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did,” generally operates 
as an affirmative defense to a theft prosecution.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:20-2(c)(2).  K.A. couples that with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s holding that the claim-of-right affirmative 
defense is unavailable for robbery, see Mejia, 662 A.2d at 320, 
to contend that a robbery conviction could be based on an 
honest-but-mistaken claim of right to property.  And if so, K.A. 
submits that his robbery offense could have been based on 
conduct that would not meet the criminal intent element of the 
federal generic definition of theft offense.  But K.A. 
misconstrues the categorical approach, which considers only 
the elements of an offense, and not affirmative defenses.  See 
Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 860, 867 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2020); see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248–50 (emphasizing 
that the categorical approach focuses on the elements of an 
offense).  And because affirmative defenses have no role in the 
categorical approach, the availability of the claim-of-right 
defense for theft but not robbery is inconsequential to whether 
the elements of K.A.’s robbery conviction categorically match 
those of the federal generic theft offense.   
 
For these reasons, neither of K.A.’s arguments alter the 
conclusion that, at the time of K.A.’s conviction, all thefts in 
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New Jersey, and thus second-degree robbery in New Jersey, 
categorially matched the federal generic theft offense. 
 
* * * 
 
 When K.A. was convicted of second-degree New Jersey 
robbery and received a “term of imprisonment [of] at least one 
year,” that crime categorically matched the federal generic 
“theft offense.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  His conviction 
therefore qualifies as an “aggravated felony.”  Id. 
§ 1101(a)(43).  And because K.A. was sentenced to at least five 
years in prison for his aggravated felony conviction, he 
committed a particularly serious crime for purposes of both 
asylum and withholding of removal.  See id. 
§§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  Accordingly, even if 
his case were to be reopened – either based on his motion to 
reopen or his claim that the BIA should have sua sponte 
reopened the proceedings – K.A. would remain ineligible for 
both forms of relief he seeks.  We will therefore deny the 
petition for review. 
